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THE TYRANNY OF MONEY 
Edward J. McCaffery* 
LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF 
EXCESS. By Robert H. Frank. New York: The Free Press. 1999. Pp. 
ix, 326. $25. 
With the greater part of rich people, the chief enjoyment of riches con­
sists in the parade of riches, which in their eye is never so complete as 
when they appear to possess those decisive marks of opulence which no­
body can possess but themselves. 
-Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776 
Great wealth cannot still hunger, but rather occasions more dearth; for 
where rich people are, there things are always dear. Moreover, money 
makes no man merry, but much rather pensive and full of sorrow. 
-Martin Luther, Table Talk, LXXXII, 1569 
Probably the greatest harm done by vast wealth is the harm that we of 
moderate means do ourselves when we let the vices of envy and hatred 
enter deep into our own natures. 
-Theodore Roosevelt, Speech in Providence, Rhode Island, 
August 23, 1902 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The more things change, the more they stay the same. 
A human activity almost as venerable as the accumulation and 
opulent display of vast riches is the condemnation of the accumulation 
and opulent display of vast riches. People have been busily engaged at 
each for several millennia now. Both continue in full flower as 
America races into the twenty-first century with its liberal capitalist 
democracy ascendant around the world, its rich richer than ever, its 
less-rich curiously lagging behind.1 Yet figuring out what, exactly, is 
* Maurice Jones, Jr. Profassor of Law, University of Southern California Law School 
and Visiting Professor of Law and Economics, California Institute of Technology. B.A. 
1980, Yale; J.D. 1985, Harvard; M.A., 1994, Southern Cal. - Ed. I thank Scott Altman, 
Marshall Cohen, Carl Cranor, David Dolinko, Dan Klerman, Matt Spitzer, Eric Talley, and 
the participants in the Southern California Law & Philosophy Discussion Group for helpful 
co=ents, and Negin Mirmirani and Tim Lan for excellent research assistance. 
1. For just some of the recent books on point, see ROBERT E. GOODIN ET AL., THE 
REAL WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1999); FRANK LEVY, THE NEW DOLLARS AND 
DREAMS (1998); EDWARD WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF 
WEALTH IN AMERICA, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (rev. ed. 1996). 
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wrong with the excessive accumulation and opulent display of wealth, 
on the one hand, and then deciding what if anything to do about it, on 
the other, have been among the most troubling issues of social theory 
and political economy - far harder to pin down than the intuitive 
sense that something is, indeed, wrong. 
In his interesting, important, thoughtful, if sometimes wandering, 
repetitive, and maddening recent book, Luxury Fever, the 
psychologically-minded economist Robert Frank of Cornell University 
- coauthor, with Philip J. Cook, of the related Winner Take All 
Society,2 another widely accessible and important book - ventures 
into this familiar domain. Part economics, part social psychology, part 
autobiography, part cognitive psychology or behavioral economics, 
part game theory, part evolutionary biology, part tax policy, and part a 
journalistic foray into the lifestyles of the rich and famous in fin-de­
siecle America, Luxury Fever offers up both a view of the social 
problems presented by luxurious living and a specific type of solution 
to them. In short, Frank argues that much of our spending results 
from a desire for relative status, leading us to want "positional goods"; 
since everyone else does likewise, we end up treading water with no 
improvement in our subjective well-being or utility. We would all be 
better off if we hopped off the treadmill and directed our limited 
resources to nonpositional goods, including more savings, leisure, and 
education, whose benefits endure. Frank argues that a progressive 
consumption tax can help us all to escape in a "win-win" way from the 
collective action problem of luxury fever. His description and 
prescription each deserve to be thought through and taken seriously. 
Luxury Fever is a good, important book. 
I happen to agree with much of what Frank has to say about both 
the nature of the disease and its remedy, curiously enough involving 
tax policy.3 Where I am skeptical is at the level of the whys - the pre­
cise connection between sickness and cure. It strikes me that Frank 
plays too fast and loose here, and that it somehow matters, a point on 
which Frank himself would agree ("ideas matter," he writes) (p. 267). 
It strikes me, in fact, that what is omitted from Frank's style of analysis 
is, in the end, more important than what is included. 
2. ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER TAKE ALL SOCIETY: WHY THE 
FEW AT THE TOP GET So MUCH MORE THAN THE REsT OF Us (1995). 
3. For some of my own work on point, see Edward J. McCaffery, The Missing Links in 
Tax Reform, 2 CHAPMAN L. REV. 233, 246 (1999) [hereinafter McCaffery, Missing Links]; 
Edward J. McCaffery, The Political Liberal Case Against the Estate Tax, 23 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 281 (1994) [hereinafter McCaffery, Political Liberal Case]; Edward J. McCaffery, Real 
Tax Reform: The Case for a Progressive Consumption Tax, BOSTON REV., Dec. 1999/Jan. 
2000, at 46 [hereinafter McCaffery, Real Tax Reform]; Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Un­
der a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 1145 (1992) [hereinafter 
McCaffery, Hybrid]; Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 
104 YALE LJ. 283 (1994) [hereinafter McCaffery, Uneasy Case]. 
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But let us back up and begin where Frank himself does - with a 
portrait of the nation as an ailing patient. 
II. SICKNESS 
Look around, and something indeed seems wrong in contemporary 
America. 
The beginning parts of Luxury Fever set out the problem in some­
times gory detail - our rich are richer than ever, and boy are they 
flaunting it. As is perhaps to be expected, we learn about the author 
himself indirectly - and sometimes quite directly - through his 
choice of examples. Watches, household appliances (especially gas 
grills), wines, fancy cars (more on these anon), and houses -
mansions, really - are the recurring motifs. In each case, the thing is 
bigger, better, or faster - and always more expensive - than ever be­
fore. 
My personal favorite example - the one I have been telling 
friends and students about - is the Patek Phillipe watch that sold out 
its limited run of four for a minimum of 2.7 million dollars per watch 
(p. 16). This, I suppose, is the item on the book's jacket cover. Since 
you might as well learn about me through reading this Review, I can 
honestly say that I had never heard of Patek Phillipe until I read 
Frank's book, although I live in the shadows of Beverly Hills. I also 
take a perhaps perverse pride - more on this anon, too - in never 
having spent more than $20 on a watch. Truth be told, when my 
$19.95 Casio runs out, I often don't bother to replace its battery, which 
costs $5.00, because it's easier just to get a new watch. Perhaps this 
decadent impatience means I have a luxury head cold. 
Returning to the more general malady, what exactly the root cause 
of luxury fever is, or what exactly the best description of it might be, 
varies a bit in Frank's text. But the symptoms are clear enough. We 
are spending too much, on too frivolous things, and accordingly - by 
the zero sum logic that pervades most of the book - we are spending 
too little on good things, such as providing public goods and capital for 
our personal and collective present and futures. We are wasting our 
time and money on positional goods rather than on gains that endure. 
Now as at least in part an economist (I have a master's degree in 
the dismal science), I am obliged to point out that even wasteful, con­
spicuous consumption need not be a zero sum game. Perhaps the 
ability to engage in luxurious spending is an important inducement to 
greater productive activity in the first place. If the wealthy preeners 
noticed by Adam Smith in the opening epigraph worked harder than 
they otherwise would in order to be able to strut their stuff in public, 
then the celebrated social pie would be larger on account of their per­
haps perverse motivation and the socially granted opportunity to sate 
it. But much of Frank's analysis is static or partial equilibrium in the 
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economist's sense.4 In particular, Frank gives short shrift to the idea 
that productivity might decrease under his ideal solution - a steeply 
progressive consumption tax. 
On this as on other points, I am certaiµ that many, probably most, 
professional economists will find Frank a better journalist or psy­
chologist than an economist, although he is indeed the latter. Much of 
Luxury Fever reads like an amplification of various possible market 
failures: externalities and public goods, primarily, but also signaling in 
the presence of asymmetric information, and so on. Frank, as he does 
in all of his work,5 enriches this standard homo economicus analysis 
with some sense of "homo realisticus" (p. 248), namely that imper­
fectly rational creature who suffers from various cognitive heuristics 
and biases, as chronicled by behavioral economists and decision theo­
rists such as Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Richard Thaler. 
But when it comes to pure economics analysis, Frank is often defen­
sive (worrying about or dismissing what the "free marketeers," "liber­
tarians," or the "perfectly rational" crowd might think) on the one 
hand, and imprecise on the other. It's all well and good to go beyond 
the narrow, rational actor model, of course, but cognitive decision 
theory - for all of its ·powerful insights - is notoriously unsystematic 
and underdeterrninative. Granted that we mere mortals overreact to 
some things and underreact to others, but how can we tell which is 
what?6 I doubt that Frank will assuage critics looking for any precise 
and predictive model behind his polished popular prose. 
To illustrate, Frank somewhat curiously calls the specific idea that 
individuals will respond to incentives in the form of high tax rates on 
consumption by working less "trickle down economics" (p. 226, pas­
sim). But the idea that people respond to incentives is quite general in 
all rational choice social theory, as Frank elsewhere acknowledges (p. 
228). The economist James Mirrlees, for example, received a Nobel 
Prize in large part for his work on optimal taxation. Mirrlees's analy-
4. Frank does note in passing that: "Chaos theorists speak fancifully about how a butter­
fly's wings flapping in China might set off a chain of events th�t culminates in a hurricane in 
the Caribbean," p. 222, and many of the economists he cites are indeed using general equi­
librium models. No such model, however, seems to lie too close to the surface in the text. 
5. In addition to Luxury Fever, see FRANK & COOK, supra note 2, as well as ROBERT H. 
FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS 
(1985), and ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE 
EMOTIONS (1988). 
6. This is a point I have tried to make in my own work. Another connection I have with 
Frank is my own interest in cognitive psychology, which includes a project coauthored with 
Kahneman. See Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on 
Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995) (with Daniel J. Kahneman and 
Matthew L. Spitzer); Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
1861 (1994); Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why it Matters, 1994 WIS. 
L. REV. 71. For other treatments merging law and cognitive psychology, see generally 
BEHAVIORAL LA w AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000). 
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sis falls far short of the pejorative lay idea of "trickle down" econom­
ics, and ends up pointing towards declining tax rates on upper-income 
earners, even and maybe especially in the name of progressivity or re­
distribution. 7 
Frank's arguments against "trickle down" theorists, moreover, are 
inconsistent. He argues that we will not respond to an economic in­
centive against luxurious living by working any less (Chapter Fifteen), 
and thus that we will save more (pp. 233-35), but if we do work less, 
this will be good, too, because it is good for us to work less and spend 
more time relaxing and with our families (pp. 241-42, passim) - lei­
sure being a classic nonpositional good. Frank does not close the loop 
by explaining how, if we all respond to a "steeply progressive" con­
sumption tax by spending more time with our families, we would still 
get the "trillions of dollars" in benefits from more savings (p. 250, pas­
sim), except possibly for stating in passing that we should count the 
value of leisure time in the national income accounts (p. 242), as if 
this, alone, would help buy brick and mortar for public goods. 
It is also unclear what the exact psychological mechanism behind 
luxury fever is. Frank generally writes as if we are all the same, gov­
erned by inexorable laws of nature or the relentless pursuit of self­
interest, narrowly defined. But we are not all the same. Why do some 
of us have the fever and others not? And if all or even many of us are 
inevitably inclined towards conspicuous consumption, why would such 
people ever save anything at all? Those concerned with only their 
relative status might work even harder under a steeply progressive 
consumption tax, still spend every penny they get, and all that would 
result is more stress and possibly more tax dollars - which may be a 
good thing but it is not going to cure anyone's fever. (It's also not the 
kind of "simple and painless" "win-win" solution that Frank has in 
mind, as I consider in Part IV.) This is the maddening part of Frank's 
book - he sometimes wanders, makes debaters' points ("simply" 
seems to be his favorite word, as in "there is simply no reason . . .  "), 
and generally oversells his conclusions. To a man with a hammer, eve­
rything looks like a nail. Any reader of Luxury Fever will sense early 
on that Frank's view of human nature - as inexorably inclining us, 
absent some collective coordination device, toward destructive con­
spicuous consumptive competition - is a hammer indeed. 
In any event, Frank finds that we work too hard, stress out too 
much, and seem to be no happier than if we did not do these things 
(Chapter Five). Our savings rate is dangerously low (Chapter Seven) 
7. See J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration of the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 
REV. ECON. STUD. 175 {1971); see also A.B. ATKINSON, PuBLIC ECONOMICS IN ACTION: 
THE BASIC INCOME/FLATT AX PROPOSAL {1995). For a helpful explanation of the optimal 
tax literature and an application to progressive income taxation, see Joseph Bankman & 
Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Strnct11re: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 
75 CAL. L. REV. 1905 {1987). 
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- it has actually fallen precipitously since Frank, using data from the 
mid 1990s, sounded the alarm, although it is notoriously hard to meas­
ure.8 Our spending on public goods of all sorts is also dangerously low 
(Chapter Four); our schools, public health system, water, environ­
ment, inner cities, and infrastructure are all woefully underfunded. If 
we could just shift from the rat-race treadmill of "conspicuous con­
sumption" to more important "inconspicuous" consumption (pp. 90-
92, passim) - more free time, more savings, more spending on public 
goods - we would all be better off, probably in the increasingly fa­
miliar magnitude of "trillions of dollars." 
So something is indeed wrong. We are addicted to the high life, ir­
resistibly tempted to keep up with (or, better, .to better) the Joneses, 
for the quite precise reason that our relative status matters. This may 
have something to do with our hard wiring - a law of the jungle thing. 
Frank discusses evidence from evolutionary biologists about the col­
lectively foolish behavior of peacocks (their feathers are too big) or 
elks (antlers, this time) (pp. 149-51). Or it may be done for perfectly 
rational, cognitive, and instrumental reasons - a "signaling" thing. 
Frank discusses the need (?) of job interviewees to have the best suits 
(pp. 139-40), and, far less persuasively, of CEOs to have the biggest 
mansions. "In the current environment, Bill Gates needs a $100 mil­
lion estate to signal that he is the captain among captains of industry" 
(p. 160). Later, "[a]n American CEO needs a 15,000 square-foot man­
sion only because others of his station in life have houses that large" 
(p. 217). Apparently, size really does matter. · 
Presumably, my cheap watch aids me as an academic, as in signal­
ing to my dean that I could use a raise, although it is worth noting that 
Thorstein Veblen, whom we shall revisit below, thought that the 
scholarly class was most likely to over-extend itself in conspicuous 
consumption, in an attempt to keep up with the wealthier classes with 
whom academics inevitably mingle.9 But Veblen was a notorious 
grouch, and maybe I am just an obtuse academic. In any event, Frank 
thinks that we end up doing things that are "smart" (or at least really 
difficult to resist) "for one, but dumb for all" (Chapter Ten). 
8. See, e.g., Daniel Larkins, Note on the Personal Savings Rate, 19 SURV. CURRENT 
Bus., Feb. 1999, at 8. 
9. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 113-14 (B.W. 
Huebsch ed., 1924): 
In any modem community where there is no priestly monopoly of these [scholarly] occupa­
tions, the people of scholarly pursuits are unavoidably thrown into contact with classes that 
are pecuniarily their superiors. The high standard of pecuniary decency in force among 
these superior classes is transfused among the scholarly classes with but little mitigation of its 
rigour; and as a consequence there is no class of the community that spends a larger propor­
tion of its substance in conspicuous waste than these. 
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III. PRESCRIPTION 
Having set out the problem, Frank poses a solution that will seem 
alien to many readers but is quite close to my own heart and work -
use the tax system. Frank argues for a progressive consumption tax, a 
fairly old idea in the academic literature. Frank credits Hobbes, 
Hume, and others with the idea (pp. 212, 223). The more specific idea 
of a "cash flow" expenditure or progressive consumption tax was per­
haps best developed by the eminent British economist Nicolas Kaldor 
(he of Kaldor-Hicks fame) in a 1955 text, although Kaldor himself was 
never all that clear on the moral and political bases of the idea.10 In 
this country, the Harvard Law professor William Andrews, one of my 
teachers, most famously developed the idea in the legal literature in 
the early 1970s.11 It was picked up in an influential Treasury Depart­
ment study authored by David Bradford and others in the late 1970s, 
and became the intellectual underpinning for the Nunn-Domenici 
USA ("unlimited savings accounts") tax plan, put fonvard in Congress 
in the 1990s.12 
A progressive cash flow consumption tax is a wonderfully simple 
idea. To understand it, start with the Haig-Simons definition of in­
come, which holds, in simplified form, that Income equals Consump­
tion plus Savings (I = C + S).13 This tells us no more and no less than 
that sources equal uses or, even more basically, that all wealth is either 
spent (C) or not (S). By rearranging the simple identity, we get the 
key insight of a cash flow consumption tax: 
C = I - S  
That is, Consumption equals Income minus Savings. Add up your in­
come, as we do each year on our dreaded 1040 forms, then subtract 
your savings, and you are left with consumption - you spent that 
which you made but did not save. To this base it is a simple matter -
as simple as in the case of an income tax - to apply progressive mar­
ginal rates. 
Frank sees a progressive consumption tax as a solution to the col­
lective action problem posed by luxury fever. This is consistent with 
10. See NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955); see also Nicholas Kaldor, 
Comments to William D. Andrews, A Supplemental Personal Expenditure Tax, in WHAT 
SHOULD BE TAXED, INCOME OR EXPENDITURE?, at 151 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980). 
11. See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Case Flow Personal Income Tax, 
87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974) [hereinafter Andrews, Personal Income Tax]; William D. 
Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972) [here­
inafter Andrews, Deductions]. 
12 See LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, THE USA TAX (1997); see also DAVID F. BRADFORD 
& U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1st ed. 
1977). 
13. See McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 3, at 1149. 
May 2000] The Tyranny of Money 2133 
either the view that excessive consumption is an arms-race type prob­
lem (everybody is in a mad and counterproductive race to be the 
brightest peacock) or with the idea, not necessarily connected, that 
consumption decisions are interdependent (one person's choices affect 
others), and thus that there are classic externalities involved. In either 
case unilateral actions - "self help," as Frank calls them (Chapter 
Twelve) - are limited or altogether unavailing. 
While traditional economists at least since Thomas Schelling have 
understood the game theoretic structure of arms race problems,14 they 
are reluctant to invoke interdependent preferences, because these de­
stroy the firm conclusions of general equilibrium theory.15 This is akin 
to the need for welfare economics or rational choice theory to rule out 
envy, for otherwise Paretian norms are unavailing.16 Frank's point 
about the interconnectedness of preferences and feelings of self-worth 
(language he does not use) is an important and valuable one to stress. 
It provides an argument for consumption taxation not widely empha­
sized in the mainly economics literature arguing for such a tax. It also 
resonates with the social contractarian thought of Rawls, sounding in 
the interconnectedness of individuals in a well ordered society and, 
importantly, with the primary good of the "social bases of self­
respect."17 This is not, however, Frank's lingua franca, as we shall see. 
In recommending some form of consumption tax, Frank is clearly 
in step with the times.18 But Frank also favors - and here he is clearly 
out of step with the times - "a steeply progressive consumption tax," a 
phrase he repeats many times over. Just how steep? Frank states that 
the USA Tax, which had rates ranging up to 40%, was not steep 
enough (p. 225). In a perhaps significant glitch, in the one place he 
sets out a specific rate structure (p. 213), he produces a chart of "tax 
rates on taxable consumption" that stops at a 70% marginal rate for 
consumption between $500,000 and $999,999. But this wouldn't even 
cover a single Patek Phillipe watch purchase. Bill Gates, with his 
14. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE (1966); THOMAS C. 
SCHELLING, STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). 
15. See ROBIN W. BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 113 (1984) ("The 
first theorem of welfare economics will generally fail in the presence of jointness of con­
sumption"); Martin Shubik, Pecuniary Externalities: A Game Theoretic Analysis, 61 AM. 
ECON. REV. 713 (1971). 
16. See, e.g., Y. NG, WELFARE ECONOMICS 31-32 (1980); Geoffrey Brennan, Pareto De­
sirable Redistribution: The Case of Malice and Envy, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 173 (1973); Guido 
Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE LJ. 1211, 1216-18 
(1991); Lawrence G. Sager, Pareto Superiority, Consent, and Justice, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
913, 917-18 (1980). 
17. JOHN RAWLS, POLmCAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLffiCAL 
LIBERALISM]; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE). 
18. See, e.g., McCaffery, Missing Links, supra note 3; McCaffery, Real Tax Reform, su­
pra note 3. 
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45,000 square foot mansion, surely spends more than one million dol­
lars a year - he has to, to show that he is the "captain among captains 
of industry." Just how high would Frank's rates go? 
There is not a lot of detail in Frank's discussion of taxes. This 
might be just as well, given the public's distaste for reading anything 
about taxes other than how to avoid them or why they are evil. And 
Frank has certainly written a widely accessible book, for which he de­
serves a great deal of credit. But one omission is particularly unfortu­
nate. Frank does not mention the tax treatment of debt, except in 
passing to say that borrowing is a transition issue (p. 224). But a post­
paid consumption or expenditure tax must include debt in its base or 
the game is over. 
The reason is simple enough to see. If we allow people a deduc­
tion for savings, as a cash-flow consumption tax such as Frank pro­
poses would do, but then do not pick up borrowing within the tax 
base, people can save on the one hand and borrow with the other. 
The result is lots of consumption, no net savings - and no tax. This 
situation obtains today because of the numerous exceptions for the 
present taxation of savings under the so-called income tax. Chief 
among these is the realization requirement, which holds that no tax 
falls due until the ultimate sale or other disposition of an appreciating 
asset.19 When the value of Bill Gates's Microsoft stock increased from 
$50 to $100 billion dollars in a recent year, for example, Gates paid no 
tax on that "mere appreciation." If Gates were to borrow against that 
appreciation - presumably he can get pretty good credit card interest 
rates - and consume away, he would still pay no tax. If he dies with 
both appreciated assets and significant debt, his heirs can sell off the 
stock, pay off the debt - and pay no tax.20 Such is the tax system our 
great capitalist democracy has given itself. 
It may still sound odd to include borrowing in the tax base. But 
recall that there will be a deduction for savings, C = I - S, so borrowing 
that leads to savings will trigger both an inclusion (as I) and a deduc­
tion (as S), and thereby cancel out. On the other hand, borrowing to 
finance present consumption will generate tax. This is what we should 
want under a tax system that effects its levies on the basis of "private 
preclusive use," as Andrews phrased the matter.21 It works just like a 
sales tax - you pay sales tax, without any question, when you buy 
goods using a credit card. Frank's proposal is, in essence, for a pro-
19. Andrews refers to Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), as the Achilles' heel of 
the tax system. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 11, at 1129·30; see also 
McCaffery, Real Tax Reform, supra note 3. 
20. See I.R.C. §1014 (1994) (stepped-up basis for assets acquired from a decedent). 
21. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 11, at 1155-57. 
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gressive national sales tax, as I have independently called the idea in 
my own work.22 
There is a lot to be said for such a consistent, progressive consump­
tion tax. One very large problem with the current tax system is its 
incoherent and unprincipled blending of consumption and income tax 
elements, which leads to the arbitrage operation I described above. 
We save without paying tax under a consumption tax model (as within 
tax-favored pension plans or IRAs, or via the realization require­
ment); then we borrow and spend away under the income tax model, 
which does not tax debt. This means that there can be consumption 
without taxation - that the way things are is upside down compared 
to where Frank, myself, and others would put them. This also means 
that a consistent consumption tax will have a very important base­
broadening effect, one that commentators on tax policy typically ig­
nore. While the systematic deduction for savings will shrink the tax's 
base, the systematic inclusion of debt-financed consumption will in­
crease it. Combined with the fact that we need have no preferential 
rates for capital gains under a consistent cash flow consumption tax, it 
is far from clear that a "revenue neutral" conversion to a consumption 
tax will mean any increase in the rate structure at all. I'll come back to 
this idea later. 
A final and related point that Frank, not a public finance or tax 
theorist, fails to stress is how close the current system already is to a 
consumption tax.23 Perhaps this is because Frank wants to emphasize, 
at least at times, the "radical" aspect of his proposal (p. 223, passim). 
To be fair, Frank's proposal is radical in today's political climate. But 
its radicalism relates to the nature of Frank's arguments for it, and, 
more so, to its rate structure. As a matter of, the tax base - of the 
"what" of taxation, as opposed to the "how much" - we already 
largely have a consumption tax. Since all income is either consumed 
or saved, and we do not tax much savings as is, we are mostly taxing 
spending: the luxuries that Frank describes are already being pur­
chased with after-tax dollars. The two major differences between the 
status quo and Frank's proposal would be higher tax rates and, again 
ideally, the inclusion of debt-financed consumption. 
A powerful argument for moving all the way towards a consump­
tion tax is that life in the middle is precarious.24 The USA Tax plan, 
for example, which did not feature "steeply" progressive rates, was not 
a terribly radical idea: in a nutshell, you can get there by "simply" re­
pealing the limits on tax-deductible IRA contributions (although you 
must then include borrowing as income, as the USA plan tragically did 
22 See, e.g., McCaffery, Missing Links, supra note 3, at 250-51. 
23. See, e.g., McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 3, at 1152-55. 
24. See generally id.; see also McCaffery, Real Tax Reform, supra note 3, at 47. 
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not).25 Frank may be doing a disservice to the public political culture, 
not well versed in tax policy by any means, by confusing the base and 
rate issues, and making a consumption tax, per se, appear to be a radi­
cal idea. But he is surely to be commended for adding to and broad­
ening the popular understanding of a very important public policy 
proposal. 
IV. DIAGNOSIS 
Something is wrong with our wealthiest citizens flaunting the luxu­
rious life, and all or at least many of us following in their shadows. 
The tax system can be part of the solution to this thing. So far, so 
good. But what, exactly, is it that's wrong? Consider four possibili­
ties: 
1. Luxury fever is immediately irrational or self-harming, in that it 
does not even bring pleasure to the individual patient, so to 
speak; it has the structure of an addiction. Moralists like 
Luther, in the opening epigraph, clearly held this sentiment. If 
true, curbing the fever is in everyone's interest, and so the solu­
tion is, in welfarist terms, strictly Pareto superior. In the lan­
guage of modern welfare theory, this is a subjective, ordinal, 
but paternalistic argument. 
2. Luxury fever is individually rational in isolation, but irrational 
in the aggregate - it is "smart for one, dumb for all," as Frank 
repeatedly (but not consistently) puts it; the disease thus has 
the structure of a prisoner's dilemma or arms race type prob­
lem. This is because status - which matters, according to 
Frank, for a variety of instrumental and material reasons, in­
cluding health (pp. 140-45) - is a relative construct, leading us 
to crave positional goods. Everyone wants the fastest car or the 
most expensive watch, just because it is the fastest or the most 
expensive. But the social race to obtain the fastest and the 
most expensive positional goods is collectively foolish. Curbing 
the fever is a matter of devising the correct collective coordina­
tion device that will again be, in welfarist terms, Pareto supe­
rior. This is classic subjective, ordinal welfarism without pater­
nalism. 
3. Luxury fever can be enduringly rational on the individual level 
- it really is good to be king - but is bad for the collective be­
cause the losers' pain is worse than the winners' gains, and the 
whole game leads to a loss in aggregate welfare. A collective 
action solution that in part redistributes wealth is to be pre­
ferred. But this can no longer be on Paretian grounds, as there 
25. See SEIDMAN, supra note 12, at 31-32. 
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are now "losers" in the realignment. It must rest rather on 
straight utilitarian (or "Kaldor-Hicks") grounds, looking to 
"the greater net balance of social well-being," as Rawls would 
put it.26 This is subjective cardinal welfarism, a strand of theory 
currently very much in vogue in the legal academy.27 
4. Luxury fever is, well, just plain wrong, quite apart from (though 
not indifferent to) its consequential effects. This is as a matter 
of basic social justice and fairness, in the spirit of Kant or 
Rawls. Such a social contractarian theory makes reference to 
objective social values and our moral obligations to others. It 
steps outside subjectivism alone. 
Frank does not clearly separate the first three arguments. But he is 
decisively, and consistently, in one of them. He is, in other words, a 
thoroughgoing, subjective welfarist. It is Frank's clear desire to press 
the second argument, though he sometimes slips into the third -
where I believe the argument better rests. But to my sensibilities, the 
most glaring omission in Frank's analysis is that he never approaches 
the fourth argument - the broader one incorporating objective moral 
reasoning. 
As best I can tell, the word "moral" appears only twice in Luxury 
Fever (words such as "duty," "obligation," "justice," and "fairness" or 
their cognates fare no better; "fairness," for example, is discussed only 
briefly, referring to empirical studies assessing the effect of the percep­
tion of fairness, not fairness itself, on individual behavior (p. 116)). 
Frank first uses "moral" when he explains his general approach in the 
book: 
This diagnosis of why our current spending patterns are problematic sug­
gests the possibility, at least in principle, of reducing the speed of the 
consumption treadmill, thereby freeing up resources that can be put to 
various uses that would make more of a difference in our lives. For now, 
I will say only that this can be accomplished in a simple and painless way. 
My case for change is purely pragmatic, one based on self-interest alone. 
It rests not on the social critic's claim that luxury consumption is self­
indulgent or decadent, but rather on detailed and persuasive scientific 
evidence that if we adopt a simple change in the incentives we face, all of 
us can expect to live longer, healthier, and more satisfying lives. 
26. John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 532 (1980). 
27. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, .AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1998; RICHARD 
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY(1999) [hereinafter POSNER, 
PROBLEMATICS]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient 
than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1984) [hereinafter 
Kaplow & Shavell, Redistributing Income]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Principles of 
Fairness Versus Human Welfare: On the Evaluation of Legal Policy, Discussion Paper No. 
277, Harvard Law School (Mar. 2000) <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center>. 
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Yet it would be a mistake not to acknowledge that the case for changing 
our current consumption patterns entails a moral dimension as well . . . .  
[p. 11-12; emphasis added] 
One page later, however, Frank is backing off the "moral dimension," 
reiterating that his "aim is not to scold but to describe a striking set of 
possibilities" (p. 13). With that, he is off, down a road that explores 
the first three arguments, largely the second - trying to find a "simple 
and painless" way to help "all of us" to "live longer, healthier, and 
more satisfying lives." This culminates in a systemic solution that can 
enable "luxury without apology" (Chapter Fourteen). 
Now who, perchance, can argue with that? Frank indeed com­
ments on why his "simple and painless" and Paretian solution has not 
already happened;28 basically, he blames cognitive misunderstanding 
and a bad political system (pp. 224-26). But for these problems, we 
could arrive at the promised land of steeply progressive consumption 
taxation, apparently without any "moral dimension" to the argument 
at all. 
So Frank leaves himself with some kind of subjective welfarist ar­
gument, and he moves around, rather uneasily, among the three basic 
possibilities. Early in Luxury Fever, Frank seems to be saying the first 
- people work hard to obtain rather silly things, and it certainly 
seems as if they would be happier if they could just jump off the 
treadmill. Frank does not push this line of inquiry, although it does 
recur. It is clearly not his major point; he backs off from it in the mid­
dle chapters, where he is more often somewhere between the second 
and third arguments. 
Ironically, though, there is something to be said for this first point, 
even in the nonconsequentialist terms I mean to press. Maybe too 
much luxury is a bad thing, and a manifestation of this is that at least 
the otherwise moral person who engages in excessive luxury for 
whatever reason is left to feel pangs of guilt on this account. Luther 
thought that "money makes no man merry, but rather pensive and full 
of sorrow."29 Garry Wills describes Thomas Jefferson, perhaps 
America's first great excessive consumer, as also being conflicted 
about his own possibly tragic lack of thrift.30 Roberto Unger, a leading 
advocate of restoring a richer, normative vision of human nature to 
legal scholarship, argues that luxurious living alienates man from his 
own true nature and his fellow man.31 The fabulous scale of human 
28. Compare Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 
YALEL.J 1211 (1991). 
29. See opening epigraph: MARTIN LUTHER, TABLE TALK 82 or LXXXII (William 
Hazlitt trans., Fount Paperbacks 1995) (1569) (posthumous). 
30. Garry Wills, Storm over Jefferson, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 23, 2000, at 1618. 
31. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 
(1984). 
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wealth today certainly allows our best dressed peacocks to far outstrip 
the rest of the flock in a way inconceivable to other species; one really 
can end up all dressed up with nowhere to go, as the archetypal Kane 
learned too late for his own subjective well being. 
Frank also has a problem here, as elsewhere, with his tendency to 
reduce human nature to universal essences. If biology leads all people 
to compete for status - if we all have the fever - it is not clear that 
anything can change us. But if, as certainly seems to be the case, only 
some of us have the fever, why cannot Frank argue that those without 
it are better off than those with it? This indeed seems to be one of the 
points of his discussion of individual savings behavior (pp. 98-100); 
spenders are penny-wise and pound-foolish on their own lights. The 
possibility of individual myopia has led some scholars to suggest ex­
plicitly paternalistic social savings policies.32 But Frank is, for all of his 
wide reading and interdisciplinary range, a contemporary economist 
and social scientist first and foremost. Like his fellow travelers, he 
wants to stick with Paretian norms and to avoid paternalism at all 
costs (p. 273, passim). He cannot reside happily in the domain of this 
first argument, which holds that at least some people are behaving 
foolishly on their own lights. 
This leads Frank to the second argument, the collective action 
problem - that we could all be happier if we stopped the insanity of 
excessive conspicuous consumption, so to speak. This argument is 
Frank's most original and important contribution to the public policy 
debate. It is a nice and interesting insight, and it might well be true in 
some cases and to some degree. But it does not seem all that tenable 
as a global matter of practical or political reality. Does Frank really 
believe that high spending Americans would be better off under a con­
sumption tax with marginal rates ranging in excess of 70% ?  Or that 
they would find this solution "simple and painless"? If so, it would 
"simply" be a case of convincing them of this reality. Read this book 
and repent, ye self-interested fools of little faith! 
Yet Frank clearly (or "simply") does mean to be saying this. Con­
cluding his panegyric in favor of a steeply progressive consumption 
tax, he writes: 
The catch? There is none. The extraordinary beauty of the progressive 
consumption tax is its ability to generate extra resources almost literally 
out of thin air. It is a win-win move, even for the people on whom the 
tax falls most heavily. [p. 224] 
Frank returns to this theme again and again; the book ends with a sub­
section entitled "money for nothing" (p. 279). 
32 See, e.g., Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1275 
(1991). 
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Perhaps Frank really believes his own rhetoric. But it hardly 
seems satisfactory as an all-encompassing view of human nature, 
American society, or modern times. Unless we are saying that the rich 
are spending too much as is under their own lights - the dreaded pa­
ternalism point - it must be the case that they are only spending at 
high levels because of relative status issues, which they cannot avoid 
for biological or rational reasons - we are all peacocks or job-seekers, 
in the end. Is this true? There are of course other reasons to spend ­
most of which, absent an elaborate array of deductions, would be 
taxed under Frank's steeply progressive consumption scheme. 
Spending on private education, health, or security may not be con­
spicuous or positional at all, but such spending, left unlimited, might 
still be unfair. In any event, if all that some or most of us cared about 
were relative status, why would things be any different under a steeply 
progressive consumption tax? Isn't it possible that we would save 
even less, and work even more, to hold true to our peacockian na­
tures? 
Frank never discusses in his rich book the fact that most rich 
Americans are not like his consumption-obsessed paradigm at all. 
Most millionaires seem to be frugal, and most elderly wealthy people 
continue to save, not dissave as both standard economic theory and 
Frank's "homo realisticus" model both suggest that they should. Ac­
cording to the popular best seller, The Millionaire Next Door, 10% of 
America's millionaires have never spent more than $47 for a watch 
(there is hope for me yet); 50% have never spent more than $235, and 
only 1 % have ever spent more than $15,000.33 Granted that there is a 
self-selection involved - frugal people are more likely to become 
millionaires in the first place - there is still obvious self-restraint 
against the fever out there. Frank's only explanation of such frugality 
and thrift, within his own terms, is that such people are constrained by 
"social norms," a limited and unsatisfying placeholder for some sense 
of moral convention or propriety. I'll revisit social norms below. 
As for my own humble scholarly self, I do not personally think that 
my simple, inexpensive watch is a signal of my unconcern with mate­
rial pleasures, or a biological attempt to find a mate with similar values 
so that we can perpetuate a more Kantian species. Truth be told, I 
would find it unconscionable personally to spend thousands, let alone 
millions, on a watch, and I don't much care what my fellow persons 
think. If I had such millions (I don't), I would want to save them, or 
give them to charity; I certainly would not want to wear them on my 
wrist. I think I am autonomous in this thinking; maybe I am deceiving 
myself. But we can all at least hope - or pretend - that I am not. 
33. See THOMAS J. STANLEY & WILLIAM D. DANKO, THE MILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR: 
THE SURPRISING SECRETS OF AMERICA'S WEALTHY 32 (1996). 
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The fact that many of us are savers does not argue against a pro­
gressive consumption tax: far from it. That such a tax is consonant 
with basic American values makes it more, not less, likely to succeed.34 
It does, however, change the argument structure. Since excessive lux­
ury spending is no longer an unavoidable fact of nature, we can argue 
against it in moral and/or redistributive terms, as Frank does not. 
More generally, live by the sword, die by the sword. If the empiri­
cal evidence for Frank's claims under this second argument founder -
and these are very stringent empirical claims indeed, given the insis­
tence on at least a near unanimity condition that the Pareto (or win­
win) principle requires - so do his claims themselves. Early on in the 
book Frank presents evidence that money, at least above a certain 
level, does not buy happiness (Chapter Five). Now I think there is 
room to quibble with these studies; some people, such as the Japanese 
in one study Frank cites, seem to say that they are always moderately 
happy, which is not such a bad state of mind to carry through life's vi­
cissitudes (or at least to tell a surveyor). But granted that such meas­
ures of subjective well-being capture the status quo, what if the num­
bers change? What if - as I suspect is increasingly true in America 
since the Reagan Revolution helped to legitimate greed and lessen the 
guilt of the good life - people really start becoming happier by 
spending more on themselves? Or what if we could make them hap­
pier, not by a "steeply progressive consumption tax," but rather by the 
"simple and painless" step of convincing Americans to overcome their 
puritanical opposition to luxuries, along with all notions of envy and 
guilt? Would that justify "luxury without apology"? 
Another problem with Frank's second argument circles back to an 
omitted aspect of the tax discussion. Frank makes a common mistake 
in thinking that a move to a consumption tax must decrease consump­
tion and increase savings. It need not. The form of the tax system is 
neutral as to the aggregate level of capital savings.35 I personally be­
lieve that we can and should have a consistent consumption tax be­
cause it would lead to a better, fairer, more sensible version of what 
we have now. A progressive consumption tax would get wealthy peo­
ple consuming out of capital to pay some tax, and would give all the 
rich a choice of how to serve the public good - through ostensibly 
private savings that add to the common capital stock, or through the 
progressive taxes levied on their choice of lifestyle.36 But the corre-
34. This argument is central in Edward J. McCaffery, Tax's Empire, 85 GEO. L. REV. 71, 
106·07 (1996) [hereinafter McCaffery, Tax's Empire]; see also McCaffery, Uneasy Case, su­
pra note 3, at 345. 
35. See Edward J. McCaffery, Being the Best We Can Be (A Reply to My Critics), 51 
TAX L. REV. 615 (1996) [hereinafter McCaffery, Being the Best]. 
36. Note that by allowing a deduction for charities, we could give the rich their choice. 
See McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 257-58. 
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sponding higher revenue from a more inclusive tax base, higher rates 
on big spenders, and lower costs of capital, could be used "simply" to 
lower taxes on middle class consumption. 
In other words, a consistent and progressive consumption tax could 
get and allow the rich to save, and then stop trying to get the middle 
classes to do so. Much of current tax policy has been obsessed with a 
targeted and probably futile attempt to do just the opposite.37 There is 
much to be said for both the fairness and the efficiency of allowing 
those with the most to save save, and leaving the rest of us, many of 
whom live from paycheck to paycheck, alone. But if Frank's picture 
of human nature is correct, this use of a steeply progressive consump­
tion tax move would only free up the middle classes to get on, or speed 
up, their own consumption treadmills. Veblen was well aware that this 
could happen - that luxury fever has its analogs among the lower 
economic classes.38 But such greater spending by the middle classes 
would in turn push those up the ladder to fret that they must compete 
more. This would certainly make them feel unhappy - thanks, but no 
thanks - with Frank's "painless and simple" plan to make us all bet­
ter off. 
A steeply progressive consumption tax that self-consciously aimed 
to reduce present consumption, or to shift work into leisure, in con­
trast, will have redistributive effects across generations and among 
people with different preferences. It will fall on spending on nonposi­
tional as well as on positional goods, though the motive for the former, 
by definition, cannot revolve around a concern for relative status. It is 
not a "painless and simple,'' "win-win" kind of deal, and I sense that 
Frank has done a disservice in the midst of his generally noble public 
service by overselling this point. Not everything is a nail, after all, 
even to a man with an especially elegant hammer. 
This all leads to the third argument - that a progressive consump­
tion tax is justified on classical utilitarian grounds, redistribution and 
all. Frank is extremely tentative in endorsing this view, and does not 
really flatly come out and say it. He sometimes makes a nod, as Rich­
ard Posner does, to quasi-Paretianism, weakening the unanimity con­
dition.39 But he wants to pull up short, to stick to this we-would-all-be­
better-off line, implausible as it may seem. It is also more than a little 
sad that Frank feels he must argue this way. 
37. See McCaffery, Reai Tax Reform, supra note 3, at 47. 
38. VEBLEN, supra note 9, at 36. 
39. POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 27. 
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Ultimately, Frank's book rather unwittingly illustrates what I take 
to be the single greatest challenge to normative social and legal theory 
as it is practiced in law schools and elsewhere. I suspect that the most 
common criticisms of Luxury Fever will come . from economics sorts 
frustrated with the absence of more formal analytic rigor, a point that 
Frank repeatedly anticipates and that I touched on in Part II. But I 
am more troubled by the virtually complete absence of explicit moral 
theorizing, a point that Frank all but ignores. 
A book on the topic of luxurious living could "simply" not have 
been written at any time in recorded history until the last few years 
without some discussion of moral theory. F,rank repeatedly credits 
Adam Smith, quite properly, with beginning the line of inquiry. Smith 
was certainly sensitive to the moral dimensions of the story; he was a 
professor of moral philosophy, after all, most proud of his own Theory 
of Moral Sentiments, who infused the far more widely cited Wealth of 
Nations with ethical concerns. Amartya Sen ha� complained about the 
reductionist reading of Smith, stripping this rich thinker of his moral 
dimensions: 
[I]t is precisely the narrowing of the broad Smithian view of human be­
ings, in modem economies, that can be seen as one of the major deficien­
cies of contemporary economic theory. This impoverishment is closely 
related to the distancing of economics from ethics.40 
With Sen's view in mind, it is especially troubling not only that Frank 
repeatedly reduces Smith to a prophet of self-interest (p. 171), but also 
that he should give Charles Darwin pride of place over Smith among 
"the only two men" from whom "our modem understanding of com­
petition derives almost entirely": "Smith's view was by far the more 
optimistic, but Darwin's more hard-edged analysis holds the key to 
understanding our current situation" (p. 146). Apparently we persist 
perilously close to the ethical awareness of peacocks. 
Darwin influenced Thorstein Veblen, the most important precur­
sor to Frank's effort - although he only receives a passing mention in 
the text (p. 14). This is unfortunate, for Veblen is a subtle and inter­
esting thinker who deserves more study today. He wrote widely in 
criticism of economists and on the connections among religion, cul­
ture, morals and competitive economic systems.41 Consider his analy­
sis of "waste," both the term and the concept, in The Theory of the 
40. A.MARTYA SEN, ON Ennes & ECONOMICS 28 {1987). 
41. See generally A VEBLEN TREASURY: FROM LEISURE CLASS TO W AR, PEACE, AND 
CAPITALISM {Rick Tilman ed., 1993). 
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Leisure Class.42 Veblen first notes that the conspicuous consumption 
of the rich must be wasteful: 
Throughout the entire evolution of conspicuous expenditure, whether of 
goods or of services or of human life, runs the obvious implication that in 
order to effectually mend the consumer's good fame it must be an ex­
penditure of superfluities. In order to be reputable it must be wasteful.43 
Interestingly, Frank is never prepared to go this far; he does not gen­
erally question whether there is some detached, objective benefit to a 
luxury good. Veblen simply asserts that positional goods at the upper 
reaches must be wasteful. 
Veblen, however, has a problem here. Like Frank, Veblen is 
clearly trying to be a classical social scientist. He wants to avoid ques­
tioning individual rationality. Veblen thus notes a problem with the 
moralistic flavor to the word "waste": 
The use of the term "waste" is in one respect unfortunate. As used in the 
speech of everyday life the word carries an undertone of deprecation . . . .  
It is here called "waste" because this expenditure does not serve human 
life or human well-being on the whole, not because it is waste or misdi­
rection of effort or expenditure as viewed from the standpoint of the in­
dividual consumer who chooses it. If he chooses it, that disposes of the 
question of its relative utility to him, as compared with other forms of 
consumption that would not be deprecated on account of their wasteful­
ness.44 
Veblen, like Frank, wants to avoid paternalism, so he allows the indi­
vidual's decision to be dispositive of his own self-interest. But Veblen 
goes far further than Frank ever does, because he does not confine 
himself to Paretian outcomes. Veblen goes back to the use of the 
"term 'waste' in the language of everyday life" and explains the reason 
it "implies deprecation of what is characterized as wasteful": 
In order to meet with unqualified approval, any economic fact must ap­
prove itself under the test of impersonal usefulness - usefulness as seen 
from the point of view of the generically human. Relative or competitive 
advantage of one individual in comparison with another does not satisfy 
the economic conscience, and therefore competitive expenditure has not 
the approval of this conscience.45 
In one fell swoop, Veblen goes where Frank fears to tread: he gives us 
a reason to curb "luxury fever," which he calls "competitive 
expenditure," not by a necessarily "simple and painless" "win-win" 
means, but so as to satisfy the dictates of an "economic conscience." 
42. VEBLEN, supra note 9, at 97-101. I discuss the concept of waste in Edward J. 
McCaffery, Must We Have the Right to Waste?, in NEW EsSAYS IN TIIE LEGAL AND 
POLffiCAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (Steven Munzer ed., forthcoming 2000). 
43. VEBLEN, supra note 9, at 96. 
44. Id. at 97-98. 
45. Id. at 98. 
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This collective sensibility is grounded in objective, interpersonal 
values, and located in the domain of ordinary language and moral 
sentiment. Veblen is thus somewhere between the third and fourth 
arguments above; the conspicuous expenditures of the rich are bad 
from an impartial spectator's point of view, whether that point of view 
is a classical utility-based one (as in argument 3) or a moral, social 
contractarian one (as in argument 4). A similar structure of argument, 
including the discussion of popular morality, is still present at the time 
of Tibor Scitovsky's 1976 classic, The Joyless Economy: An Inquiry 
into Human Satisfaction and Consumer Dissatisfaction, another 
important (and relatively neglected) precursor to Frank's 
contemporary effort. These old arguments continue to have fresh 
force. Frank deserves credit for developing and pressing the clever 
second argument for a "win-win" change, but, ultimately, he might be 
wrong to put too much weight on it.46 
Frank certainly emerges from a close reading of Luxury Fever as a 
good and decent man. We learn along the way that he had served 
time in the Peace Corps with his wife of long standing. He loves 
Ithaca's college community. He thinks twice about owning really nice 
cars - he did not buy a well-priced Porsche when he had the chance 
in the 1980s, although he now drives a BMW (pp. 168-69, 203). (Frank 
also concedes late in the day that he now also has a gas range with two 
15,000 Btu burners - which he considers "the signature emblem of 
1990s superfluity" - but he takes some comfort in noting that he does 
not have four such burners, as some fellow Ithacans have (p. 266).) 
He cares about his children and their education, and is respectful to­
wards his wife. Most importantly for the present purposes, of course, 
Frank has dedicated much of his considerable intellectual gifts to try­
ing to understand what might be wrong with an economic structure -
advanced liberal market capitalism - that all too many people are 
simply celebrating as ideal. In Luxury Fever and in his other works he 
has crossed disciplines and written with sensitivity and grace about 
how to make the world a better, happier place. 
But must Frank defend his rich ideas in the often impoverished 
language of subjective welfarism? Perhaps ordinal utilitarianism has 
become the lingua franca of normative social theory today, but that 
does not mean it is right - and that we all must end up arguing over 
the facts of the matter instead of their basic social justice.47 The sec­
ond time I found the word "moral" in Luxury Fever came very late in 
the day, when Frank writes about a public employment program. He 
46. See Cass R. Sunstein, Vanity Fair, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 29, 1999, at 13 (re­
viewing LUXURY FEVER) ("[Frank's] argument is both . . .  plausible and ingenious . . .  but I 
am not sure Frank is right."). 
47. See id. (questioning Frank's facts). 
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thinks that this program would be a good place to spend the savings 
from a progressive consumption tax: 
Completely apart from our moral responsibility to provide the best pos­
sible opportunities to our neediest families, a well-implemented public­
service employment program would deliver high value for our dollars. 
Notwithstanding the prospect that federal welfare-reform legislation will 
reduce the number of people in our inner cities who are officially eligible 
for support from the government, these bleak environments will continue 
to produce large numbers who are ill-equipped to make it on their own. 
And the fact that they may not be eligible for welfare payments does not 
mean that they will cease to be costly to society. [p. 263] 
This is what saddens me. Once again Frank feels compelled to argue 
"completely apart from moral responsibility." Those of us who strive 
to generate normative legal scholarship are being told, with ever in­
creasing if ever more puzzling force, that moral theory must be ban­
ished from our tool kit, replaced by something more avowedly conse­
quentialist and "pragmatic" - namely subjective welfare.48 But is it 
really the case that the fact vel non of our - of a decent society's, that 
is - obligation to the less fortunate is a narrowly empirical matter? 
That we must demonstrate that the gains to the poor somehow out­
weigh the "losses" to the rich - that the "net balance of social well 
being" has increased - in the spirit of the third argument, above, in 
order to advocate basic decency? Or, worse, must we show that there 
is in fact no loss at all to the rich, in the spirit of the second argument? 
That our "pragmatic self-interest" alone justifies all change? That our 
money is being well spent on our own terms - we are getting a good 
"bang for our buck," as the awful saying goes? Is this what we have 
come to? And what will happen if the trend of our times continues, 
and we cut more and more the official "support from the govern­
ment," so that the argument from backwards induction - we will have 
to pay more for them later, so we might as well educate them now ­
fails, as an accounting matter? 
If this is where we have come, despair might be appropriate. Con­
sider Rawls's recent plaintive cry in response to the voices of a more 
self-interested and amoral political theory: "If a reasonably just soci­
ety that subordinates power to its aims is not possible and people are 
largely amoral, if not incurably cynical and self-centered, one might 
ask with Kant whether it is worthwhile for human beings to live on the 
earth?"49 Surely we can do better than to be better peacocks. 
One ought to pause before prescribing in the name of a largely 
amoral humanity. Frank does not. What passes for morality in 
Luxury Fever gets wrapped up in Frank's discussion of "social norms" 
48. See, e.g., POSNER, PROBLEMATICS, supra note 27; Kaplow & Shavell, Redistributing 
Income, supra note 27. 
49. RAWLS, PoLmCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 17, at !xii. 
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(pp. 201-03). This is an amorphous idea that has entered into the 
nonnative lexicon of legal theory of late.50 A large part of its role 
seems to be to supplant anything approaching the autonomous 
exercise of moral reasoning. Social norms just are, in the standard 
view - though more often than not, the project of the "social norms" 
school is to show how such norms represent a spontaneously 
generated private ordering that tends towards efficiency, in the 
specific sense of wealth-maximization. The nonnative theorist in any 
event is relegated to a passive acceptance of such norms. Worse, in 
their mere existence, the role of social norms is fully heteronomous -
individual actors are constrained to accept them, there is no reasoned 
discourse, no wide or narrow or indeed any reflective equilibrium at 
all. 
It is in some sense astonishing - or ought to be - that Frank, an 
economist and social scientist, seems "simply" to accept social norms 
in his personal as in his professional life. Frank tells us that social 
norms - and social norms alone - prevented him from buying that 
bargain-priced Porsche in the 1980s: "[a]t that time, a red Porsche 
convertible really would have been seen as an in-your-face car in a 
community like ours" (p. 108). He still has doubts and regrets over 
this fateful decision: 
I still wonder whether I made the right decision. In the years since this 
episode, a number of other Porsches have materialized here, and seeing 
them always kindles a twinge of regret. But what is not in question is 
that, at the time, there would have been a social price to pay had I 
bought it. [pp. 168-69] 
Fortunately enough (?), times and mores have changed a bit in Ithaca. 
Frank now has a BMW (p. 203), and seems to think that if he could do 
it all over again today, he would in fact buy the Porsche. 
Perhaps worst of all, Frank doesn't even like the role of social 
norms in combating luxury fever, in part because they are too frail, but 
also because they are too "coercive" (p. 203). Heteronomy turns out 
to be a drag - it makes it hard to buy even bargain-basement 
Porsches. Better to put the tax system in place, so that we can all have 
"luxury without apology." Free at last? 
To be fair, I agree that we should have a fairly steep progressive 
consumption tax, in part because we cannot place excessive moral de­
mands on our wealthy citizens. It is in some sense hard to be rich; too 
much money can be a distraction and a constant source of temptation, 
50. See, e.g., ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS 
SETILE DISPUTES 123-26 (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social 
Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998) (symposium issue on Social Norms, Social Meaning, 
and the Economic Analysis of Law); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and 
Negotiation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a 
Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 
(1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). 
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and the opportunities for doing good with money are complex. A 
progressive consumption tax sets up an institutionalized social struc­
ture in which individual wealthy capitalists are obliged to help, and are 
given a choice of how to do so - continue to save and invest, helping 
all through perpetuating the common capital stock, or spend on one's 
own wants but cut a large check to the collective for the privilege of 
doing so. The system sensitively takes into account human nature in 
this way. But there is no reason we have to refrain, as Frank does, 
from invoking the objective moral dimensions of such a tax - why we 
must argue that this is a "win-win" deal even for "incurably cynical 
and self-centered" people. After all, excessive spending on noncon­
spicuous private consumption can well be a moral harm - and it 
would be just as affected by Frank's steeply progressive consumption 
tax. Yet Frank cannot argue, by definition, that such spending is an 
arms-race type problem that cannot make its individual producers 
happy. 
Fortunately, the facts of the matter do not point us down the 
gloomy Darwinian path. As a strictly empirical matter - and this I 
think is important, for lots of reasons - not all the rich have luxury 
fever. In fact, most don't. This is the central point of the widely 
popular The Millionaire Next Door, and it is backed up by more schol­
arly research.51 Wealthy savers are not imposing social harms in any 
obvious way - saving is one of the activities that a reasonably just so­
ciety should want its most productive citizens to do, at least as long as 
there are some constraints on the private use of capital to unjustly af­
fect politics or markets.52 Rawls writes of "frugal capitalists as op­
posed to the spendthrift aristocrats," the former being those who up­
hold their "natural duties to society."53 The problem with 
contemporary tax policy is that it is backwards: it currently punishes 
the thrifty millionaire-next-door types, and thus relatively rewards the 
spendthrift with luxury fever.54 A progressive consumption tax re­
verses course; it falls on spenders, not savers. This seems like the fair 
and just, as well as sensible, result, in large part because social struc­
tures do shape character and choice of lifestyle. One can come out 
rather close to Frank on the details, in other words, without ignoring 
the "moral dimension." 
51. See STANLEY & DANKO, supra note 33, at 27-69; see also LAURENCE J. KOTLJKOFF, 
WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS? (1989); McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 3, at 1187-88 and 
notes (citing sources). 
52. This point - that a consistent progressive consumption tax can regulate the use of 
nominally private capital - I have consistently made in my work. See McCaffery, Being the 
Best, supra note 35, at 632-33; McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 353-56. 
53. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 299, 537. 
54. See McCaffery, Real Tax Reform, supra note 3, at 47. 
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Frank's insights about the tendency, at least, towards excessive 
conspicuous consumption are still critically important, but not because 
we all, inevitably, have the fever. Rather we can understand life in 
advanced wealthy capitalist societies as a constant battle between the 
thrifty and the nonthrifty, those that have the fever and the million­
aires next door. There is even a risk that luxury fever is getting worse, 
although Frank is largely anecdotal on this differential point. Pre­
cisely because lifestyles are variables that the social structure affects 
- precisely, that is, because we are not "incurably" cynical and self­
interested - our tax policy ought to get it right. We make choices. 
Frank even acknowledges - in passing - that we might be free: "I 
do not mean to suggest that we are not creatures of free will on some 
meaningful interpretation of the term" (p. 176). Social norms come 
from somewhere. There can be better or worse norms, more or less 
followed. The law can or cannot support these better ones: the law is 
inevitably moral.55 This is especially so in an area as pervasive, large, 
and coercive as tax. 
As Machiavelli wrote, "hunger and poverty make men industrious, 
[but] laws make them good."56 If we drop the attempt to appeal to the 
"better angels of our nature"57 in the law, we can do no better than to 
become happy peacocks. Let's hope we can aim higher, and in this at­
tempt to make us as good as we can be, moral theory - of the old 
fashioned Kantian sort - deserves a seat at the table. 
VI. A CHALLENGE FOR PO LID CAL LIBERALISM 
Before closing, I want to make a few comments on how a nonutili­
tarian, social contractarian approach to the problem of luxury fever -
and to tax policy - might play out. 
Frank is clearly writing right in the grip of something that Rawls is 
very much concerned with: the social bases of self-respect, among 
other matters of moral psychology and social justice. But Frank's 
mechanistic, materialistic analysis and conception of human nature sits 
uneasily, if at all, with the very reason for Rawls's social contractarian 
project - the working out of a Kantian conception of people as free 
and equal moral beings.58 Frank's picture of human beings also seems 
too limited to be a global description of our species, although it cer­
tainly captures some aspects that at least some of us have at least some 
55. This point I make in Edward J. McCaffery, Ronald Dworkin Inside Out, 85 CAL. L. 
REV. 1043 (1997). 
56. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 118 (Luigi Ricci, 
Random House ed., 1950). 
57. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, reprinted in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 
1859-1865, at 224 (Library of America ed., 1989). 
58. See Rawls, supra note 26. 
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of the time. Frank's depiction of luxury fever and its root causes 
should add to our understanding of our complex and frail human na­
tures. But it is simply not a matter of irresistible biological impulse 
that people who have a lot of wealth must show it; this is a contextual 
matter, and one that affects social justice. 
Why then, has moral theory been banished from the social doctor's 
medicine bag? Why can't Frank just come out and say that something 
is indeed wrong with individuals' owning $2.7 million watches? Now 
taking myself to be a moral theorist,59 maybe it is partly our fault. Af­
ter all, philosophy has been credited with killing god, embracing plu­
ralism, and letting the pragmatic genie out of the bottle. The once re­
gal discipline has of late flaunted its skepticism and tried to rebuild 
itself on the basis of evolutionary biology or rational choice social the­
ory. 00 Why should a social scientist look to moral theory, when moral 
theory itself has been running for help to the social sciences? 
A related dimension of the same problem - the seeming inhospi­
tality of moral theory to normative social scientists like Frank - re­
lates to the role of religion. The critics of luxury fever in the past have 
typically had God on their side. The ancient prophets fall into this 
category, along with Luther and the Puritans, of course, and many 
other religions condemn excessive luxury.61 Smith's condemnation of 
luxuries came from within a distinct religion, Presbyterianism. Veblen 
and Scitovsky, modern social scientists, stood outside any particular 
religious tradition, but each evoked religious norms in understanding 
the social regulation of consumption. Yet Frank, writing at the dawn 
of a new millennium, with postmodernism and political correctness as­
cendant, does not - and within the social norms of our times, cannot 
- invoke particular religious precepts. With the moral case against 
59. I think my credentials are pretty good. I majored in philosophy as an undergradu­
ate, and have used philosophical perspectives in all of my work. See, e.g. , McCaffery, Politi­
cal Liberal Case, supra note 3; McCaffery, Tax's Empire, supra note 34; McCaffery, Ronald 
Dworkin Inside Out, supra note 55. 
60. In this admittedly scandalously quick summary, I am thinking of the varied works of 
Nietzsche (on the death of god), Richard Rorty (on pragmatism), Bernard Williams (on 
skepticism and the limits of philosophy), Allan Gibbard (on the use of evolutionary biology), 
David Gauthier, Brian Skyrms, Greg Kavka and others (on rational choice social theory). 
See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, TB:us SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA (R.J. Hollingdate trans., Penguin 
ed. 1961) (1884); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979); 
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985); ALLAN GIBBARD, 
WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT (1990); DAVID 
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (reprint ed. 1987); BRIAN SKYRMS, EVOLUTION OF 
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1996); RATIONAL COMMITMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: EsSA YS 
FOR GREGORY KAVKA (Jules Coleman et al. eds., 1998). See generally HILARY PUTNAM, 
RENEWING PHILOSOPHY (1992). 
61. See, e.g., STEPHEN INNEs, CREATING THE COMMONWEALTH: THE ECONOMIC 
CULTURE OF PURITAN NEW ENGLAND (1995); BARRY SHAIN, THE MYTII OF 
INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLmCAL THOUGHT (1994); 
MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 81-91 (1985) (discussing 
views of Old Testament prophet Amos against luxury, inter alia). 
May 2000] The Tyranny of Money 2151 
conspicuous consumption linked so firmly to specific religious doc­
trines and traditions, Frank is led to sweep the "moral dimension" 
aside completely. 
Rawls and his project of political liberalism both underscore the 
problem and point the way out. On one hand, Rawls has embraced 
the "fact of reasonable pluralism,"62 and has thus banished particular 
religious - as all comprehensive moral doctrines - from the exercise 
of "public reason" to be used in setting up a just social structure. On 
the other hand, Rawls has never retreated from the view that political 
and moral theory compel us to attempt to establish, maintain, and 
support just social institutions. The central challenge for our times is 
to find a way to argue for morally acceptable social structures in a way 
that avoids moralism, in its perjorative sense - in a way that avoids 
privileging and entrenching any narrow, particular moral doctrine. 
Tax is tied up in all of this. One of the important insights to be 
gained from Luxury Fever is the way in which the tax system affects 
matters of justice, as I have been arguing throughout my work - tax 
can be both a cause of social justice problems and a cure. The harms 
of luxury fever both affect the social distribution of material resources 
and go to the social bases of self respect, now identified by Rawls as 
perhaps chief among the primary goods.63 As Frank well illustrates, 
the tax system is uniquely situated to address luxury fever. Thus, so­
cial contractarian theory - social justice generally - cannot ignore 
the broad contours of the tax system on account of its impacts on the 
basic structure of society and on the reasonable aspirations of its citi­
zens. All this leads to one final question: Can political liberalism, 
stripped of anything approaching a religious voice, speak to luxury fe­
ver and its possible antidote via progressive taxation? 
Of course it can. It is a critical mistake - to my mind, the worst 
mistake one can make in reading Rawls's Political Liberalism - to 
think that moral virtues have dropped out of the social contractarian 
project. While remaining agnostic as to the internal contents of any 
reasonable comprehensive religious or moral doctrine, Rawls 
emphasizes time and again the importance of the political virtues, 
chief among them the capacity to act out of a sense of justice.64 A 
basic moral psychology and moral sense has always been central to 
Rawls's work. It is featured in an early piece on "The Sense of 
Justice," played a large role in A Theory of Justice, and persists in 
Political Liberalism. The very reason to care about justice as fairness, 
after all, is that we believe that we can do better than to be happy 
peacocks. 
62 See RAWLS, PoLmCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 17, passim. 
63. See id. 
64. See JOHN RAWLS, The Sense of Justice, in COLLECIBD PAPERS 96 (Samuel Freeman 
ed., 1999). 
2152 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:2126 
This gets back to the question of Frank's diagnosis. Perhaps luxury 
fever is bad for its own patients, and perhaps it is an arms race, the 
solution to which will be a win-win for all, no matter how incurably 
cynical and self-centered we might be. But these ought not to be the 
primary reasons for curbing the fever. Social justice should be. The 
excessive spending of the rich affects the allocation of resources, 
making nonluxury goods more "dear," in Luther's epigraph; repre­
sents a failure to save from the capitalist classes best able to do so; 
lacks objective urgency, in T.M. Scanlon's (or Veblen's) sense;65 and 
incites the kind of envy that Teddy Roosevelt noticed in another 
opening epigraph. Social scientists tend to rule out envy, for counting 
envy as a harm would disqualify many social changes from satisfying 
the Pareto principle. Roosevelt's quotation suggests that maybe "we 
of moderate means" are to be blamed, for we do the harm of envy and 
hatred to ourselves. But why should we simply rule a natural human 
feeling out of bounds in normative social theory? And why is it the 
case that envy is always and everywhere a self-inflicted wound? In A 
Theory of Justice, Rawls writes sensitively and well about envy, distin­
guishing between "excusable" envy and spite, linking envy to the so­
cial bases of self respect, and considering the conditions for a "hostile 
breakout of envy," importantly including within them the loss of a 
sense of natural duties among the rich.66 If the wealthy are signaling 
their power and obtaining additional benefits by owning million-dollar 
watches and 45,000 square foot mansions, is it really improper for the 
rest of us to complain? 
If Frank's arguments add to the case against excessive luxury 
spending, I am inclined to think more power to them. But note the 
ways in which Frank and Rawls are directly opposite, and not just in 
their concern with subjective versus objective values, third parties or 
not. Frank's picture is one of an essentially unfree, biologically driven 
human nature that must sometimes bind itself to the mast. It is be­
cause we are slaves to our appetites and drives that we must give up 
certain freedoms in the name of greater hedonistic pleasure. To 
Rawls and Kant before him, we are first and foremost free and equal 
moral beings. It is to protect and enhance our freedom and equality 
that we must curtail those actions of some of us that limit the freedoms 
and basic equalities of others of us. Holding fast to that vision of free­
dom, autonomy, and morality may be more important in the end than 
curing luxury fever. After all, ideas matter. 
65. See VEBLEN, supra note 9; T.M. Scanlon, Preferences and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655 
(1975). 
66. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 530-41. 
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VIL THE END? 
Robert Frank has written another good and important book. It 
identifies a major problem facing contemporary America, and it ad­
vances a smart, sensible solution to that problem. In bringing to a 
wide general public a powerful set of arguments for a progressive con­
sumption tax, Frank has done the world he lives in a good tum. I just 
wish that Frank and others arguing this way could more comfortably 
step outside the limited quasi-science of self-interested, subjective wel­
farist theories to make objective moral claims, and that contemporary 
moral and political philosophy would be more inviting to people of 
such interests. 
We are still born free, but we are still everywhere in chains. 
Money is everywhere, and even our normative scholars have been se­
duced by its luster. By giving us a "simple and painless" way to enjoy 
"luxury without apology," I cannot believe that Frank has pointed the 
way towards our ultimate human liberation. Maybe one day we can 
step outside the grip of money and money's worth as a metric of our 
deeper moral worth, and become free at last. For in the end, the path 
of enlightenment may best lead to a future, not where no one buys or 
wears a Patek Phillipe watch, but where none of the rest of us notice 
those that do. 
